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COMMENT
DILEMMA IN LABOR LAW: THE RIGHT TO OWN
VERSUS THE RIGHT TO KNOW
INTRODUCTION
From the line of labor decisions beginning with the Cordwainers Case1
to the most recent ones, one discernible fact is that the effort of labor
unions to achieve a power balance with management has been extensive.
And, at every step toward this ideal, the unions have been met with
opposition by management. While some students of labor law feel that
unions have now seen the scales tipped in their favor, others would
disagree.
This comment explores one of the most recent conflicts between labor
and management. It concerns the National Labor Relation Board's
legal justification for requiring management to turn over to the union
the names and addresses of all employees eligible to vote prior to Board
conducted elections. Specifically, the comment analyzes and evaluates
the recent decisions of the Board in the Excelsior Underwear, Inc.
case 2 and the General Electric Co. case' in the light of past Supreme
Court decisions, Board policies, and other pertinent material in this area.
THE DECISIONS WHICH FORMULATE THE NEW RULE
To more fully appreciate the problems presented a brief consideration
of the Excelsior and General Electric cases is first necessary.
The Excelsior "case" actually involved two separate cases in which
the unions petitioning for Board certification had requested the employers
to furnish lists of names and addresses of all employees prior to the
coming election. The purpose specified by the unions was to allow them
to answer alleged material misstatements, made by the employers
shortly before the election date. The employers did not comply with the
requests and the unions lost both elections. Upon objections filed by
both unions to the employers' conduct affecting the results of the election,
the Board held that the employers did not interfere with the elections
1. See Cordwainers Case, 3 Commons & Associates, Documentary History of American
Industrial Society 59-248 (1910). The Philadelphia Cordwainers, which was organized in
1794, was probably the first genuine trade union in the United States. It successfully struck
against a cut in wages in 1799, but when it struck again in 1806 the court applied the common law, and convicted the leaders of the strike for criminal conspiracy. This action
destroyed the union. Other unions sprang up during this same period among printers,
carpenters, tailors and hatters, but they were generally short-lived.
2. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 61 L.R.R.M. 1217 (Feb. 4, 1966).
3. General Electric Co., 61 L.R.R.M. 1222 (Feb. 4, 1966).
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by failing to furnish the requested lists. However, continuing its policy
of refining its rules regarding election conduct in the direction of higher
standards, the Board announced a new and different rule for future
cases; i.e., commencing 30 days after February 4, 1966, all employers
would be required to file such employee name and address lists with
the Regional Director within seven days after the execution of agreements
by the parties for conducting an election, or, in elections directed by
the Board or its regional directors, seven days after the election has been
directed. 4 The lists are then to be turned over to the union. As will
be more fully discussed later, unions claim to need such lists so that
union election information may be readily transmitted to, or personal
contacts arranged with the eligible voters.
On the same day that it made its decision in the Excelsior case, the
Board also decided the General Electric case. There, several days before
the Board-directed election, the employer made a non-coercive antiunion speech to its employees at a meeting arranged during working
hours on the plant premises. One day before the advertised meeting,
the union requested permission of the employer to attend the meeting and
to debate the issues then and there. The employer denied the request.
When the union lost the election, it filed objections to the employer's
election conduct. The Board held, consistent with its Livingston Shirt5
decision, that the employer did not violate Section 8(a) (1) of the Act
by refusing to afford to the union the opportunity to speak in rebuttal
to the employees during working time and on company property. Of
significance to future cases was the fact that the Board indicated that it
would, possibly in the future, review the Livingston decision and current
Board policy in general, but would refrain from doing so until it could
first fully appraise the practical results which would flow from the
Excelsior decision. The Board stated:
In light of the increased opportunities for employees' access
to communication which should flow from Excelsior, but with
which we have, as yet, no experience, and because we are not
4. The only exception is the expedited elections conducted pursuant to Section 8(b) (7)
(c). In this situation, we believe that the time span between the direction of election
and the conduct thereof is too brief, taking into account the time required for the
employer to compile and file a list of names and addresses, for the union to be able
to make any meaningful use of this information. Hence in that limited situation,
we do not require disclosure.
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 61 L.R.R.M. 1222, 1219 n.14 (Feb. 4, 1966).
5. 33 L.R.R.M. 1156 (Dec. 17, 1953). It may be noted that Livingston is not on all
fours with the instant case. In Livingston the problem was not between the employer and
non-employees, as in the instant case, but rather between the employer and employees, and
dealt with the employees' right to the use of company property during working hours. The
employee request was denied, but the employees were permitted to speak after working
hours on the company property.
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persuaded on the basis of our current experience that other
fundamental changes in Board policy are necessary to make
possible that free and reasoned choice for or against unionization
which the National Labor Relations Act contemplates and which
it is our function to insure, we perfer to defer any reconsideration of current Board doctrine in the area of plant access until
after the effects of Excelsior become known.'
WHY THE DECISIONS ARE IMPORTANT
The importance of the two decisions is that Excelsior at once makes
available better means of communication between the union and the
employees, and General Electric offers the potential for still greater
union flexibility; i.e., direct access to the employees by the unions,
on the company's property. An examination of the problems which
contributed to the formulation of the new rule of Excelsior makes these
effects clear.
Before a union may effectively campaign for membership in a plant,
it is obviously necessary that it be able to communicate with the employees in order to inform them of the union program and intended
manner of operation. For various reasons, the union may find it difficult or impossible to accumulate a list of all the employees' names, and,
if it does, it may find it impossible to locate the employees. NLRB v.
United Steelworkers7 is a case in which the Board was confronted with
just such a problem. There, the union organizers, after diligent efforts,
managed to acquire the names and addresses of 1,250 of the 3,100 employees in the plant. To convey its "message" to the other 1,850 employees, the union had to rely on "catching" them somewhere between the
employer's property and the employees' homes. Such a procedure has
been made generally necessary because of the Supreme Court's ruling that
union agents who are not employees have no right to obtain access to the
employers' property for campaign purposes during working or nonworking hours unless the union has no reasonable alternative means of
reaching the employees.' As a result, the union is often, as a practical
matter, denied effective contact with the employees, especially where distribution of leaflets at plant gates for various reasons is not fully effectual.
Moreover, the meaning of "reasonable alternative means" is obviously
not an exact standard, and represents an invitation for litigation in
varying fact situations.9 For example, if a union's treasury is so well
6. General Electric Co., 61 L.R.R.M. 1222, 1223 (Feb. 4, 1966).

7. 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
8. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1951).
9. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 107 (1951), where the court held
that if the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees places the employees
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filled that it can readily pay for expensive radio, television and newspaper
advertisements, do such facts justify a conclusion that it had a reasonable
alternative? If the union's organizer has space to stand on the berm
of a highway leading out of the plant parking lot, and has the opportunity
of flagging down employee's cars as they exit, does the union then have
a reasonable alternative? Also, are handbills given to an employee hurrying by effective? The difficult problem of communicating with all of the
employees has been commented upon by Professor Bok:' °
A major problem confronting the organizer is the lack of accurate, comprehensive information concerning the names and
addresses of the employees involved. With the help of friendly
employees, he may obtain much of the information he needs, and
yet even in small plants, organizers believe that there are often
a few voters who are never contacted in the course of the campaign because their names and addresses are unknown. With
larger companies, this problem becomes increasingly serious.
The organizer must either resort to some petty and underhanded
stratagem for obtaining the necessary data from the front office,
or risk leaving a substantial number of voters with little more
than a handbill to inform them of the union's position in the
forthcoming election.
In some cases, no substantial problem of communication may be
present if the union is fortunate enough to have a suitable number of
employees working in its behalf, since employees ordinarly have the
right to solicit membership and to campaign on the union's behalf
during non-working time" on the employer's property. 2 Employees
may also "talk union" among themselves. Such employee rights may
be limited by the employer only where their activities interfere with
production or discipline, 8 disrupt employee unity or harmony, or involve
publication of libelous or slanderous matter.' 4 However, this direct mode
of communication is often of limited value since many employees refuse
to work for the union for fear of some possible employer reprisal.
beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them, then the employer's
refusal to allow the union to approach his employees on his property is a violation of 8(a) (1)
of the Act.
10. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38, 99 (1964).
11. Even if the employees are paid during rest and lunch periods, that time is considered
theirs and subject to solicitation by the pro-union employees. Olin Industries, Inc. v. NLRB,
191 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 919 (1952); NLRB v. J. H. Rutter Rex
Mfg. Co., 229 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1956).
12. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
13. NLRB v. May Dept. Stores Co., 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946).
14. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1951).
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THE BOARD'S RATIONALE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR ITS
REQUIREMENT THAT EMPLOYEES NAMES AND
ADDRESSES BE FURNISHED TO THE UNION
In order to legally justify its position in Excelsior, the Board had to
cope with two perplexing questions. These problems were: (I) would
employee rights be infringed upon by the new rule; and (II) would the
new rule conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Babcock and
Wilcox" and/or NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America (Nutone).16
The employer had argued that his supplying of the list would interfere
with his employees' right to refrain from joining a labor organization
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, and protected by Section 8(a)(1)
and 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act. The employer added that once the union
acquired the list, it could subject ". . 17. employees to the danger of harassment and coercion in their homes.'

The Board's response to these contentions was threefold. First, it
noted in general that what the new rule requires is no more than what
is available for public inspection in our civilian elections; that lists of
names and addresses of all qualified voters be available; and that all
parties interested in the election have the right to use these lists for
whatever purpose they desire. Second, the Board considered that the
Section 7 guarantee of a right to refrain from union activity would not be
violated by having the employer submit a list of employee names and
addresses because all the employer is doing is aiding the employee to
acquire a better informed basis for the choice he must make-to join
or refrain from joining a labor organization. Third, the Board brushed
aside the "harassment and coercion" argument advanced by the employer:
We cannot assume that a union seeking to obtain employees'
votes in a secret ballot election, will engage in conduct of this
nature; if it does we shall provide an appropriate remedy. 8
The Board's answers reveal its obvious desire to reach a practical
and workable solution to comport with its conclusion that there does
exist a need for a more effective means of informing all employees of
"both" sides of the story in a Board conducted election. It considered
that the resulting "better informed choice" would strengthen the democratic fiber which is necessary for an ordered democracy.
The Board's answers appear to have a logical basis. As to its analogy
to civil elections, it is quite true that in such elections all interested
15.
16.
17.
18.

Ibid.
NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America (Nutone), 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 61 L.R.R.M. 1217, 1220 (Feb. 4, 1966).
Ibid.
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parties may have access to voting lists, and this opportunity permits
each party to contact all potential voters and inform them of his position.
Thus, the electorate may be better informed, and a social structure that
more nearly approaches democratic ideals will develop. Conversely, it
seems obvious that those who are to make a choice about whether to join
or refrain from joining a union should know as much as possible about
the union. Allowing unions to have a means of communicating with
employees as effecive as that available to management is the best way to
inform employees of the arguments of both sides, and to better educate
them in their choice on election day. The implementation of this democratic philosophy in the area of insuring that the union would respond to
the desires of the majority of the membership was an important part
of the motive behind the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin). 1 9
The Board's second answer tends to partially repeat the same reasoning.
Section 7 of the Act provides:
Employees shall have the right of self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities .... '0
This portion of the Act guarantees freedom of choice. But how can a
person effectively choose between two alternatives, the Board reasoned,
when he is only given one side of the story? Thus, the employer, by
furnishing the list, is effectuating the policy of the Act by aiding the
employees in making an educated choice. When the employer furnishes
the list the union then has an opportunity to present its position and
as a direct result the employee has the opportunity to hear both sides
of the question, and, after analyzing both sides, he has a basis for making
an intelligent decision.
The Board's refusal to accord any weight to the employer's contention
that the union will use the lists for the purpose of harassment and
coercion also appears well founde-d. It is not logical or reasonable to
assume that the union would harass someone whose support it wanted
at election time. This assumption is especially valid when the choice
will be made by secret ballot. Common sense indicates that if we want
someone to favor us in a secret ballot election, we should persuade
rather than harass them.
19. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act),
73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1959).
20. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) as amended by 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
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The second question the Board considered was whether its decision to
require furnishing of the lists would conflict with the Babcock & Wilcox
case and/or United Steelworkers (Nutone). The employer had argued
in Excelsior that such a requirement would violate the principles of
these cases because reasonable alternatives did exist, by which the union
could reach the employees. The employer also had argued that the
giving of the lists would interfere with a significant employer interestthe right to keep his own business information away from others. The
Board concluded that both of these employer contentions were invalid.
The Board noted that even though other methods of general communication were available to the union, the name and address lists would
add an element of certainty to the communication of the message.
It said that furnishing of the lists would insure the opportunity of all
employees to be reached by
all parties in the period immediately preceding
21
a representation election.

The employer's argument that its business information was being interfered with was effectively answered by the Board, which pointed out that
the "alternative channels of communication" argument is a valid one only
where the ". . . employer's interest in controlling the use of property
owned by him"' 22 is at issue. "Here . . . the employer has no significant

interest in the secrecy of employee names and addresses."2 " Thus the

Board need not consider ". . . the existence of alternative channels of
communication before requiring disclosure of that information. ' 24 The

Board further noted that assuming arguendo there was a substantial
employer interest in non-disclosure, the employer waives any contention
against the existence of a valid question of representation when he
consents to the representation election. Similarly, where the Board
directs an election, it does so because under all the evidence it has
found that a bona fide question of representation exists. Thus, the employer's interest is waived for the sake of determining the representation
question.
Finally, the Board stated that while it would not rule on whether a
refusal to produce the lists would constitute the "interference, restraint,
or coercion" type of unfair labor practice which violates Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act, it did indicate that a possible violation might be involved.
It stated:
... we are persuaded.

. .

that disclosure is one of the safeguards

necessary to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining repre21.
22.
23.
24.

Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 61 L.R.R.M. 1217, 1220 (Feb. 4, 1966).
Id. at 1221.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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sentative by employees 25 and that an employer's refusal to
disclose, regardless of the existence of alternative channels of
communication, tends to interfere with a fair and free election.2 6
Although the rules and analysis which the Board propounded are
workable, further inquiry might be made to determine whether the
Board was justified in concluding that its Excelsior rule was not precluded by the Babcock & Wilcox, and Nutone cases. Further distinctions
could have been made. First, the Nutone case could not possibly be in
conflict because the issue there was essentially whether employees could
solicit on company time and property in violation of a valid no solicitation
rule. The Excelsior case does not deal in any way with employee rights,
the use of company time, or company property. Real property rights
have been crucial to the question because in all prior cases of labor and
management conflicts dealing with the solicitation of membership the
Board and the Court balanced the employees' right to bargain through representatives of their own choosing with the employer's right to control his
real property. Thus, ordering the use of the employer's "personal property"
freely distinguishes it from other union solicitation cases involving the
use of company real property. Also, the instant case does not deal with
an employee-employer conflict but rather a union-employer controversy.
This important distinction has been noted in past court decisions.
The Babcock & Wilcox case also presents other distinguishing factors
in addition to the Board's persuasive argument that the reasonable alternative test has no applicability in Excelsior. The distinction between the
employer's real property and his personal property, as first noted, is
fundamental, and on this basis alone an additional distinction can be
made. As for interference with the employer's property interest, a pragmatic view recognizes that the only "interference" will be with the employer's previously dominant position in keeping from the union the names
and addresses of all qualified voters.
THE MATTER HELD IN ABEYANCE IN THE GENERAL
ELECTRIC CASE
In view of the Board's conclusion in Excelsior, the General Electric
case emerges as important in this evaluation only for the limited purpose
of examining the Board's reasoning in refusing to permit the opening of
another avenue for union-employee communication; i.e., the union's oral
25. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 61 L.R.R.M. 1217, 1221 (Feb. 4, 1966), citing NLRB v.
A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330; see also NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309
U.S. 206.
26. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 61 L.R.R.M. 1217, 1221 (Feb. 4, 1966).
27. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1951), where the court notes
that there is a distinction when dealing with employer rights in relation to employees and
non-employees, i.e., in union solicitation controversies.
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presentation to employees on company property during work time,28 until
future examination of the results which may flow from the Excelsior
decision. This approach in General Electric obviously stems from the
Board's hope that the Excelsior rule may effectively overcome the union's
problem of communication with all of the employees.
It is submitted that while the Excelsior ruling is a step in the right
direction, it will not effectively solve the overall problem of communication, and that a decision which would afford the union the right to reply
to employer anti-union speeches on the employer's time and property, or
at least to reply on the employer's property if not on its time, regardless
of reasonable alternatives, is what is really needed. The basis for this
contention is that, while the lists will assist the union in making its approach to the voters a week or two before the election either through the
mails or through personal visits, this method of communication becomes
ineffective when employers with large work forces make anti-union
speeches before captive audiences a few days before the election. The
short period of time available makes it impracticable for the union to
reach the employees, even with the aid of employees' names and addresses.
Professor Bok appears to be of the same opinion, for he notes that in the
last few days of the campaign "[1leaflets [sent through the mails or
handed out at the home] may not be read, radio and newspaper advertisements are less reliable . . . and house calls cannot be made in sufficient
numbers to serve the needed purpose."2 9 Professor Bok therefore suggested a solution which is worthy of consideration:
...[O] ne possible solution would be to provide that in elections
involving 75 or more employees, the employer could not deliver
a speech to his employees during working hours within the last
seven days of the campaign unless he permitted the union to do
likewise, nor could he allow his supervisors to solicit during this
period without relaxing his ban on solicitation by the employees.80
By rejecting the union's request in General Electric and relying, at
least temporarily, on the Excelsior rule to remedy the communication
problem, the Board has probably encouraged further litigation, and
possibly even legislative action.8 '
28. The General Electric case was concerned with the problem of whether or not the
employer's conduct in refusing the union equal time to reply on the company property to
employer speeches was sufficient to set aside the results of the election.
29. Bok, supra, note 10, at 101.
30. Id. at 102.
31. Reference should here be made to the fact that in a federal election all means of
communication afforded through the public media of broadcasting, if given to one candidate,
must be given to the other. Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended,
73 Stat. 557 (1959), 47 U.S.C. 315 (1959). An analogy can be drawn with the Board con-
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SOME CONCLUSIONS
As suggested, it is doubtful that Excelsior will remedy the campaign
communication problem. One thing is certain: Excelsior is a positive
advance toward a democratic process. The courts in past decisions, and
students of labor-management relations, have long felt that something
had to be done in order to afford unions a more equal opportunity to communicate with their employees.3 Professor Bok advocated and anticipated the Excelsior rule several years ago, noting that "[t]hese difficulties
could be alleviated to a significant degree by requiring the employers to
divulge the names and addresses of the employees." 3 Organizers generally have felt that Excelsior was overdue if for no other reason than to
stop the "underhanded" union practices in acquiring the employee lists.
Yet, even with such practices, organizers seldom ever acquire all the
employee names.34
While Excelsior was a necessity, it does not solve all problems. The
supplying of employee lists may not suffice when several days before the
election the employer forecasts the possibility of loss of jobs, the moving
of the plant, the trouble brought on by strikes, union corruption, and
other anti-union comments. This practice leaves the union with insufficient time and means for effective rebuttal.
Thus, although the remedy considered in the General Electric case is
considered justifiable for the above reasons, it is doubtful that it can be
justified on any "psychological" basis, as suggested by Professor Bok.
It is worth noting that union organizers are interested in the
right to equal time for reasons other than to rebut employer
statements late in the campaign. In particular, many organizers
place great importance on the psychological advantage of being
given the status of addressing the employees within the plant
itself. This interest, however, has never been considered suffiducted elections. In federal elections, the most effective media of communication are radio and
television broadcasting. In Board elections the most effective media of communication are
speeches on the employers' property with al the employees present. Thus it follows that if it
has been seen fit to give equal time in federal elections to the most effective media of communication that same policy should prevail at Board conducted elections. While the problem of the
employers' property rights vs. the right to a free and informed choice still exists, the fact
remains that under the Communications Act the property rights of the broadcasting industry are limited in that they must submit their property to the use of a political party with
which they possibly are not sympathetic, if they have permitted the other political party to
use their facilities.
32. Latourneau Co. of Ga., 43 NLRB 1253 (1944). "Moreover the employees' homes
are scattered over a wide area. In the absence of a list of names and addresses, it appears that
direct contact with the majority of respondents' employees away from the plant would be
extremely difficult." See also, Bok, op. cit. supra, note 10.
33. Bok, supra, note 10 at 101.
34. A striking example is NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
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cient to justify incursions on the normal rights of the employer
to control the use of his premises."
The Board's new rulings may present other unexpected ramifications
for the employer. It is worthy of note that an employer who becomes
over-cooperative and furnishes the employee lists to a union before
agreeing to an election may be faced with a possible Section 8(a) (2) violation. Thus, if an employer realizes a union is seeking to organize his
shop and in order to expedite the procedures leading to an election, he
releases to the organizing union the employee list, his conduct may be the
cultivation of a Section 8(a) (2) violation.8 6
It is considered apparent that other means than what Excelsior provides are necessary in order to establish a proper balance of employee
communication between labor and management. It is submitted that the
public interest in our democratic society should do away with the employee non-employee distinction and give to the non-employee union
organizer at least the same privileges as those given to the employee
when soliciting for union representation.8 7 This distinction, based upon
effectuating a proper balance in each case between the free choice of
representatives guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, on the one hand, and
property rights of the employer, on the other hand, is not so basic that it
cannot be changed. In our society we strive for democratic systems.
Fundamental to these systems is the right to freedom of choice. In order
to give the benefit of this democratic principle to all those employees who
must make a choice at Board conducted elections, the best possible
method of communication must be made available to both sides. Our
law and society need not enforce property concepts where they give an
employer the right to keep off his property non-employee union organizers
who contribute to a democratic choice by showing the employee another
view or idea.8 However, we should not remain oblivious to the difficult
dilemma facing our law; i.e., should property rights so engrained in our
society be over-ridden by the right to a free and informed choice?
Finally, of what value is the right given to the employee to solicit if
he is untrained in the art of union solicitation? In this connection, it must
be remembered that before any election may be conducted where the
35. Bok, supra, note 10 at 101 n.174.
36. This argument assumes that there has been no demand for recognition made by the
union, or if there was the employer showed that he had a good faith doubt that the union
represented the majority of his employees and thus the representation question would be
submitted to the procedures of a Board conducted election.
37. For employees' rights see Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
For union rights in this situation, see NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1951).
38. It is perhaps not essential that the employer permit the non-employee organizer to
solicit during company time, but he should at least be permitted on company property when
the employees are present.
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employees initiate Board processes, thirty percent of them must file a
petition. Fairness and justice require that if this number of employees
want to determine the union representation issue, the employer should be
required to give all affected employees the opportunity to hear both sides
by permitting the trained non-employee organizer to enter the property
and state his position.
While other approaches may exist, it seems that the suggested solutions have the most validity in the face of the perplexing problem presented. Other methods would only offer temporary relief, and defer the
problem for which a final solution has been long overdue.
Joseph Pass Jr.

